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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                      
No. 08-4337
                     
GAYANE GRIGORYAN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
___________________________________ 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A099-604-976)
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Rosalind K. Malloy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 7, 2009
Before: BARRY, SMITH and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed- December 8, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Gayane Grigoryan, citizen of Armenia, petitions for review of an order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  For the following reasons, we will grant the
petition for review and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
2opinion.
I.
Grigoryan entered the United States in June 2001, and was later authorized to
remain until May 2002.  In February 2006, she applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”),
claiming that she suffered past persecution, and feared persecution in the future, on
account of her practice of Christianity as a Baptist.  The next month, she was placed in
removal proceedings for having overstayed her admission period.  See Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(1)(B) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)].  She admitted the
allegations in the Notice to Appear and conceded the charge of removability.
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Grigoryan’s application for asylum, noting
that it was filed more than one year after her arrival in the United States.  See IJ Oral
Decision, 20-23.  The IJ did not believe that there were extraordinary circumstances
warranting waiver of the one-year deadline.  See id.  The IJ also denied Grigoryan’s
application for withholding of removal, concluding that Grigoryan was not credible, and,
alternatively, that she had not carried her burden of proof because she failed to provide
adequate corroborative documentary evidence.  See id. at 23-31.  In particular, the IJ cited
Grigoryan’s conflation of the practices of Jehovah’s Witnesses with those of Baptists,
inconsistencies between her testimony and her asylum application, and her failure to
provide evidence corroborating her affiliation with the Baptist church.  See id.  Finally,
      Although Grigoryan devotes a significant portion of her brief to arguing that her1
untimely asylum application should have been excused because of extraordinary
circumstances, we lack jurisdiction over this issue.  See INA § 208(a)(3) [8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(3)]; Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 632-33 (3d Cir. 2006).  But, as
the Government concedes, Grigoryan’s failure to challenge the adverse credibility
determination on appeal to the BIA was exhausted because the BIA addressed the issue
sua sponte.  See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 123-24 (3d Cir. 2008).
3
the IJ concluded that Grigoryan failed to establish that she was likely to be tortured in
Armenia.  See id. at 31.
The BIA dismissed Grigoryan’s appeal, agreeing that the asylum application was
time-barred.  The Board further concluded that Grigoryan failed to demonstrate her
eligibility for other relief, noting that the IJ “identified specific, cogent reasons in support
of the adverse credibility finding, for which the respondent has provided no reasonable
explanation.”  Grigoryan filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision.  
II.
We have jurisdiction under INA § 242(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)].   Because the1
BIA substantially relied on the IJ’s determinations, we consider both the IJ’s and the
BIA’s opinions.  See Kaita v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review
the adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence.  See Butt v. Gonzales, 429
F.3d 430, 433 (3d Cir. 2005).  Under this standard, the adverse credibility determinations
will be upheld if they are “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on
the record considered as a whole.”  Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  They may be overturned only if “any
      Because Grigoryan’s asylum application was filed after the effective date of the2
REAL ID Act (May 11, 2005), the IJ was allowed to make a credibility determination
“without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of
the applicant’s claim . . . .”  INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) [8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)].  We
conclude that the erroneous adverse credibility determinations described below cannot
survive even under the new standard.
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reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  INA
§ 242(b)(4)(B) [8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)].  Adverse credibility determinations must be
“supported by specific cogent reasons.”   Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 276 (3d Cir.2
2002).  Furthermore, we must uphold a determination regarding the availability of
corroborating evidence unless “a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that
such corroborating evidence is unavailable.”  INA § 242(b)(4); see also Sandie v. Att’y
Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 252 (3d Cir. 2009).
III.
The IJ first concluded that Grigoryan “confused the Baptist religion with the
Jehovah Witness religion.”  IJ Oral Decision, 23.  As examples, the IJ cited Grigoryan’s
refusal to take an oath, her explanation that she “witnesses to other people,” and her
reference to congregation members as “brothers and sisters.”  Id.  Importantly, though, the
IJ failed to acknowledge Grigoryan’s answer when asked, “What do you know about the
Baptist religion?  Can you name one key principal, one key requirement of a Baptist?” 
Administrative Record (“A.R.”), 228.  Grigoryan replied, “[t]he basis of the religion
comes from John the Baptist who was the saint that baptized Jesus Christ.  We believe
      The IJ also faulted Grigoryan for failing to provide “any evidence that she is a3
member of, or affiliated with, the Baptist Church,” such as a baptismal certificate, a letter
from the minister who performed her baptism in Armenia, or statements from other
church members in Armenia or Philadelphia.   IJ Oral Decision, 23-26.  In denying relief
based on a lack of corroboration, the IJ must conduct the following three-part inquiry:  (1)
an identification of facts for which it is reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) an inquiry
as to whether the applicant has provided information corroborating the relevant facts; and,
if he has not, (3) an analysis of whether the applicant has adequately explained his failure
to do so.  See Toure v. Att’y Gen., 443 F.3d 310, 323 (3d Cir. 2006).  Grigoryan
explained that baptismal certificates are not issued in Armenia, that she “didn’t know that
I need papers to prove that I am part of a religion,” and that it was difficult to obtain
evidence from the Russian Baptist Church in Philadelphia because she does not speak
Russian fluently and had difficulty finding transportation to the church.  A.R. 228-29,
231, 233.  Even if these explanations are inadequate, however, the IJ failed to address
other evidence corroborating Grigoryan’s Baptist faith.  For instance, statements
submitted by two family friends, her parents, and her sister, all indicate that Grigoryan is
a Baptist.  Id. at 267, 269, 275, 279.  We recognize that the IJ does not have “to write an
exegesis on every contention” raised by the movant, see Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d
166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002), but remand may be required when the record suggests that the IJ
5
that . . . by being baptized a person can come clean of [sins] – and . . . can become a real
Christian, and they can become one with God.”  Id.  She also described the process of
being baptized, in both Armenia and at the church she attended in Philadelphia, id. at 229-
30, and explained that “witnessing” is “not an obligation” but is “how I feel about my
religion, and I need to share it.”  Id. at 245.  In any event, “[b]oth history and common
sense make amply clear that people can identify with a certain religion, notwithstanding
their lack of detailed knowledge about that religion’s doctrinal tenets.”  Rizal v.
Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2006).  Under these circumstances, we believe that
any negative inference drawn by the IJ based on Grigoryan’s alleged “confus[ion]” about
the tenets of her religion was not supported by the record.3
failed to take into account significant evidence.  See Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 260,
269 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Cham v. Att’y Gen., 445 F.3d 683, 693 (3d Cir. 2006)
(recognizing that an IJ must “actually consider” the evidence presented by a party).
6
The IJ’s adverse credibility determination also relied on an alleged “significant
inconsistency” concerning Grigoryan’s proficiency in the Russian language.  See IJ Oral
Decision, 26-27.  In a space on the asylum application form to indicate “[w]hat other
languages do you speak fluently,” Grigoryan wrote “Russian.”  A.R. 380.  In the written
statement submitted in support of her application, Grigoryan stated that she moved to a
different neighborhood “because there is a big Russian population in that area, which
made my living easier because I didn’t know English very well.”  A.R. 395.  According to
the IJ, these statements were “in total contradiction to” Grigoryan’s testimony that “she
only attended [a Russian Baptist] church occasionally because of her difficulty with the
Russian language” and “faulty language skills.”  IJ Oral Decision, 26-27.  We believe that
this conclusion is based on too literal a reading of the averment in Grigoryan’s asylum
application, which “asked only if [she] was fluent, with no attempt to inquire into various
degrees of proficiency one may have with a foreign language.”  Senathirajah v. INS, 157
F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1998).  In fact, Grigoryan explained, “I do understand Russian, but
I don’t speak so fluently.”  A.R. 233.  Because she understood Russian, but not English,
her decision to move to a neighborhood in the United States with a large Russian
population was not implausible.  Therefore, we conclude that substantial evidence does
not support the IJ’s finding that Grigoryan provided inconsistent accounts of her
      The IJ also questioned “how a stranger would know that this woman walking down4
the street was a Baptist.”  IJ Oral Decision, 24.  But, contrary to the IJ’s finding that
Grigoryan “did not say that she went out to discuss God with people,” id. at 25, she
testified that “I did talk to my classmates and people that I knew in school about
[baptism].”  A.R. 238.  
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proficiency with Russian.
Although Grigoryan produced medical records documenting various injuries
allegedly caused by her persecutors, the IJ noted that “there is absolutely no evidence in
the record that the injuries described in those reports have any connection to the beatings
she experienced as a Baptist.”  IJ Oral Decision, 25.  Grigoryan testified that she was
assaulted on the street in March 2000, when three people jumped on her, pushed her
against a tree, held her by the throat, hit her in the head, and cursed her, stating that
Baptists were traitors against Christianity and had no place in Armenia.   A.R. 222. 4
When she returned home, Grigoryan’s mother called an ambulance.  Id.  The record
contains two statements from the Director of the “Emergency Aid” and
“FastMedicalHelp” services, indicating that Grigoryan was diagnosed on March 17, 2000,
with “hematoma under eyes, waist and thighs because of hitting.”  Id. at 261, 426. 
Grigoryan further claimed that “[a]fter two days our doctor came and saw me at home.” 
Id. at 223.  This allegation is corroborated by a statement from Grigoryan’s doctor:
I . . . saw patient Gayane Grigoryan, who had black spots under her eyes, on
different parts of her body and a l[u]mp on her head.  The patient was
scared and weak.  She was given antibiotic, pain reliever, and calming
medications.  After the time of getting those injuries the patient asked for
medical help from Fast Help Services.  (They) asked for my help on March
819, 2000.
Id. at 423.  In addition, a statement from a doctor in the United States supports
Grigoryan’s testimony that she saw a doctor “just after I arrived” because of left hip pain. 
Id. at 225-27, 299-300.  Because the date and nature of Grigoryan’s injuries, which she
claimed were caused by individuals who targeted her on account of her religion, match so
closely with the medical reports, we conclude that substantial evidence does not support
the IJ’s conclusion that Grigoryan failed to establish a nexus between her injuries and a
protected ground.  Cf. Butt, 429 F.3d at 438 n.11 (acknowledging that support for asylum
claim may exist where, inter alia, “the general nature of [the petitioner’s severe injuries]
were corroborated by [a] doctor’s note.”).  
Although the findings described above are not supported by the record, the IJ did
properly identify an inconsistency involving the identity of one of the individuals who
attacked Grigoryan in September 2000.  In her asylum statement, and again in her brief to
the BIA, Grigoryan stated that a person named Ashot, whom she recognized from her
cousin’s gym class, punched her in the face.  See A.R. 46, 394.  She testified, however,
that “[t]he guy that I knew, Ashot, wasn’t the one that was hitting me.  The other one hit
me.”  Id. at 224.  These statements are clearly inconsistent, and Grigoryan has not offered
any explanation for the discrepancy.  
IV.
We may affirm an adverse credibility determination even where, as here, a portion
9of the IJ’s analysis is flawed.  See Tarrawally, 338 F.3d at 187 (affirming adverse
credibility finding as supported by substantial evidence even though “[s]ome of the IJ’s
reasons for his adverse credibility determination were based on presumptions not
grounded in the record”); see also Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 401
(“[W]e are not required to remand where there is no realistic possibility that, absent the
errors, the IJ or BIA would have reached a different conclusion.”).  But a remand is
warranted when we cannot state with confidence that the IJ would reach the same
decision in the absence of the erroneous findings.  See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338-39 (2d Cir. 2006) (“If the reviewing court undertakes to
determine whether remand would be futile, it should assess the entire record and
determine whether, based on the strength of the evidence supporting the error-free
findings and the significance of those findings, it is clear that the agency would adhere to
its decision were the petition remanded.”).  In this case, the only error-free finding
involves the discrepancy concerning the name of the individual who hit Grigoryan during
the September 2000 assault; the remainder of the IJ’s credibility and corroboration
determinations are flawed.  Under these circumstances, we cannot confidently predict that
the IJ would reach the same result on remand.  
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Grigoryan’s petition for review and
remand to the Board to determine, without regard to the erroneous adverse credibility and
      On remand, the Board should separately consider whether Grigoryan established a5
prima facie claim for relief under the CAT.  See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 467,
476 (3d Cir. 2003). 10
corroborating evidence findings described above, whether Grigoryan is entitled to relief.  5
We express no opinion as to the ultimate outcome.
